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 In a recent article, Joshua Greene and Jonathan Cohen add welcome voices to an
emerging discussion about the place of neuroscience in law and social policy.1 They argue
convincingly that new data from the developing neurosciences will dramatically and
helpfully change our legal system by forcing it to take cognizance of developments in our
understanding of human capacities, a process that will move it and us away from our
retributive urges and toward a more compassionate consequentialist form of punishment
in the future.  I agree with their empirical prediction:  The more we learn about we actually
function as human animals, the more we will tend to accommodate and partially
(educationally) forgive those who suffer under these genuine (if non-pathological) functional
deficiencies.  On that we agree completely.  Where we part ways is in our relative
commitments to a kind of neuroscientific determinism or essentialism.  I think their view
of the future of neuroscience and its influence is overstated and, from a contemporary
jurisprudential view, unnecessary to defend.  
In my effort to both propagate their view and its dampen fervidness, I want to put the
larger issues in a jurisprudential context.  First, I set the stage by discussing the commitment
of our legal system to compatibilism, which permits our jurisprudence to both accept the
truth of determinism and insist on individual free will at the same time.  Then I situate the
Greene and Cohen article within the debate about free will and highlight the positive
contribution it makes, namely, forecasting the potential shift away from retributivism and
toward a greater understanding of  our neurobiology and the distribution of capacities
among “normal” individuals.  Next, I discuss the path-breaking work of Benjamin Libet, who
3has shown decisively that some of our freely-willed actions are preceded by neurobiological
processing of which we are unaware.  This work, and similar efforts, is central to the thesis,
to which Greene and Cohen subscribe, that free will is an illusion – a trick our neural
processors play on us (unwitting dupes).  Finally, I suggest why their commitment to
neurobiological determinism overstates the data and is unnecessary to fulfill their desire and
mine that we move toward a less primitive theory of punishment and toward one that truly
respects individual capacities.
I
There is a deeply held presumption in Anglo-American jurisprudence according to
which conduct is worthy of praise or blame only if it reflects an actor’s intentions.2 HAdam
Smith, in his celebrated explanation of the “irregularity of the sentiments,” begins by
asserting that the judgments we make about moral accounting – conduct we judge as worthy
of merit or demerit – seem to turn on three elements;  (a) the actor’s intention, (b) the action
thereby produced, and (c) the unwelcome consequences that the action delivers.3 Smith, like
latter day subjectivists,4 argues that elements (b) and (c) – actions and consequences – are
logically unrelated to our assessments of blame (or praise).5 The consequences, he asserts,
are “indifferent either to praise or blame;” only the “intention or affection of the heart”
should matter.6 More recently, the late British scholar H. L. A. Hart proposed that we
“[c]onsider the law not as a system of stimuli [but as] what might be termed a choosing
system,” designed to induce or deter certain conduct, “in which individuals can find out, in
general terms at least, the costs they have to pay if they act in certain ways.”7 The basic point
is that unless the actor whose conduct is under scrutiny “could have done otherwise,” that
is, unless we can (formally) conceive that he had the capacity, opportunity, and ability to
4choose among options, then it is unfair to saddle him or her with either legal or moral
responsibility.8 From this conventional perspective in our jurisprudence, choice – both the
capacity and opportunity to choose – is key.9
The existence of choice, at the level of metaphysics, presupposes a compatibilist view
of free will, one in which we enjoy the freedom to effect alternative courses of action despite
the existence of determinist forces;10 that is to say, despite the belief that “for any given time,
a complete statement of facts about that time, together with a complete statement of the laws
of nature, entails every truth as to what happens after that time,”11 individuals retain the
freedom to choose.  This position is essentially Kantian, although its roots are much older.12
Kant distinguished between practical reasoning, which is the capacity to make the right
decisions when we must, and theoretical reasoning, which permits us to forego the
abstractions necessary to make an immediate decision and see the full universe from an
“objective,” third-person perspective.13 In the Metaphysics of Morals, for example, Kant
writes that the “[f]reedom of the act of volitional Choice [pure reason] is its independence
of being determined by sensuous impulses or stimuli.”14 On a view of the world through
such intuitive lenses, the reality of determinism is ever-present.  Notwithstanding the
ineradicability of nature, we rational human possess the power to choose:  Kant asserted
confidently that it is “just as impossible for the most subtle philosophy as the most common
human reason to argue freedom away;” philosophy “must therefore assume that no true
contradiction will be found between freedom and natural necessity in the very same human
actions, for it cannot give up the concept of nature any more than that of freedom.”15 
While the basic Kantian approach to the metaphysics of law and morality remains in
place,16 a debate viewed as oppositional continues to brew between devotees of choice and
5those who favor character as grand explanations of moral philosophy and criminal
jurisprudence.  The debate is, on the view offered here, misdirected in many respects.17 For
example, at the elemental level of ontology – how we categorize our many expressions of
“human-ness” – the dispute is fixed on a conception of the mind-body problem in which
both choice and character are binary issues:  One either can or cannot make good choices;
that is, one acts or does not act within a scheme of shifting understandings of
reasonableness, on the one hand;18 and, on the other, one’s character either is or is not
flawed.  On the conventional view, every actor is deemed to be at least potentially liable for
all “chosen” wrongdoing, absent “gross and verifiable” psychopathology.19 The problem with
this view is that it assumes the existence of a neurobiological on-off switch, a view that is not
reflected in how we actually go about decision-making.  Our decision-making is not an all-or-
nothing phenomenon. 
Among the problems engendered by the conventional, outdated approach is a moral
psychology that generates a social and legal practice of blame attribution that eliminates
serious discussion about the biography of the actor whose conduct aroused our ire in the first
place.20 Moreover, the all-or-nothing criterion of cognitive and volitional competency is
measured against a minimalist measure that makes the tests of capacity practically
meaningless.21 Contemporary legal doctrine need not and should not be explained in an
either-or fashion, as Greene and Cohen realize:  These aren’t questions of choosing or not
choosing, of having good character or not.  Much like political decision-making strategies
that refuse to recognize the existence of nuance, the settled view is not merely mistaken
descriptions of human behavior.  Worse, it tends to neglect relevant data from reliable
normative sources that lie outside this very conservative paradigm.22
6II
I have suggested elsewhere that the traditional view of the intentionality of
wrongdoing is neurobiologically naive.23 In their article, Greene and Cohen conclude that
the normative jurisprudential component of law can accommodate emerging scientific
knowledge that will effect changes to our moral intuitions – to our folk psychological beliefs
about blameworthiness, for example.24 In fact, as they well understand, our legal system has
always accommodated such changes and is doing so presently.25 In this regard, Greene and
Cohen rightly gauge that those who predict that neuroscientific discoveries will effect no
major changes in law are half right.26 The jurisprudential component of our law is incredibly
rich; it is capable of embracing nuances of semantics and moral theory along with
epistemology, theology and social and economic developments.27 Greene and Cohen are also
on point when they write that this movement should, over some period of time, shift us away
from retribution toward a compassionate consequentialism, which by its nature calculates
the benefits of new scientific knowledge.  (Hence legislators purport to use some version of
aggregate utility routinely.28) As we learn more about the standard distribution of
normatively preferred cognitive and volitional capacities, with the understanding that some
members of society not now deemed grossly psychopathologically deficient are nonetheless
incapable of meeting our standards, we will soften our approach to punishment.  My
disagreement with their ideas then is small but it bears directly on any discussion about
neurobiological essentialism, a position that is not scientifically warranted and, in my view,
politically exceptionable, at least until such a warrant arrives, if it ever does.
My concern stems from a biological claim they make for which we simply do not have
sufficient data.  This disquiet arises from their “fantastical” description of a future reality
7made possible by neuroscience.  Greene and Cohen imagine an internal mental struggle over
a mundane choice, “Do I want soup or a salad for lunch today?”  They hypothesize a
neuronal convergence (what they call a “tipping-point moment”) at which point experts will
be able to isolate the precise neural circuits in conflict, color code them for inspection by
means of a future, readily available incarnation of fmri,29 and then map the precise
millisecond that corresponds to our articulated choice.  That tipping point moment, they
assert, is the cause of the choice we make.  In their storytelling, the blue-dyed neurons
defeat the red-dyed neurons and cause this imaginary person to choose A over B, salad over
soup.  Because our neurons forced the choice, and because the reigning commitment to
compatibilism insists on a choice to do otherwise as a necessary condition for a quantum of
autonomy and rationality sufficient to attribute fault, there can be no blameworthiness.30
Determinism wins.
This outlook on potential developments gives too much ground to a view of science
that instantiates a radically disengaged materialism, a neurobiological essentialism
according to which everything – everything – is neurobiologically determined.  From this
perspective, free will is illusory – a creature of our neurobiological processes.  How we might
govern ourselves under such a regime is obviously problematic; and the politics of such a
forlorn occasion, in which only the scientific elect are in the know,  are sufficiently chilling
that I cannot join them, at least until the data say that I must.  And the data don’t now say
that I must.  The available neurobiological research data permit this viewpoint but they do
not require it.31 What they have done, I think, is an example of post hoc reasoning, which
contains an enticing kernel of truth.  I have a different view of our future social epistemology
than they,32 and I think we can and will corral this unnecessary essentialist tendency.
8Their mistake is one of reasoning from a proposed real time neuronal snapshot
backwards (yes, backwards) to a causal explanation.  As I explain in some detail in the next
section, our neuronal processing doesn’t work as quickly as they hypothesize; there is always
going to be a gap between neuronal processing and action.  But before I reach that point, let
set the table a bit further by putting this quarrel into the narrower jurisprudential context
of punishment theory, which they describe accurately.  
The authors are on solid ground when they predict that the important question we
do and should ask as we make judgments about the blameworthiness of others is not the
simplistic question– “Is he rational?” – although many remain wedded to this settled view.33
 As I suggested earlier, this question has little meaning under the current descriptions of
what constitutes competency, namely, the ability to effect a simple syllogism.34 Rather, the
important question is the one that Alan Gibbard asks.  It’s not a simple question of “Who did
this?”  Rather, to avoid the non-productive glee that follows retribution – “Who did it so we
can heap scorn on him as the target of our ire?”35 – it includes crucial biographical elements:
“Who is the person who did this?”  
Here the contrast between the agenda of retributivists and that of utilitarian
pragmatists is quite clear.  Retributivists  of all stripes are interested in answering only one
question:  “Is he a criminal who deserves what he asked for?”36 This primitive question
embodies an untenable view of the composition of cognitive and volitional competency.
(And on its own terms, it assumes that we can make even reasonably determinate allocations
of fault based on “deserved” punishment.37) Instead, in every case of wrongdoing the
pragmatists asks more elucidating questions up front:  “What combination of genetic and
environmental factors came together such that this wrongdoer has become what he is now?
9How did he get here?”  “What can we do to make things better for him and us?”  As Greene
and Cohen note, the “he” in this question deserves our compassion even if, as necessary, we
segregate him from society.  These richer more hopeful and merciful questions recognize
implicitly that each of us is in fact the product of the singular mixture of genes and
environment that determines who we are.  And when we recognize and accept this as a
humane social policy for the entire body politic, we cannot help but realize that “There but
for the grace of God go I.”38 Compassion follows.
On a neurobiological view of humankind, each of us is literally a work-in-progress,
so that who the actor is at any moment in time, and the choices he or she then can effect,
depend on the actual circumstances and experiences he or she encounters.  The neurologist
Antonio Damasio makes this point:
[A]s we develop from infancy to adulthood, the design of the brain circuitries
that represent our evolving body and its interaction with the world seem to
depend on the activities in which the organism engages, and on the action of
the innate bioregulatory circuitries, as the latter react to such activities.39
What is it that causes some genes to switch other genes (and our unique neurobiological
responses thereto) on or off?  Put simply but with complete accuracy, the environment:   that
is, all the unique, non-genetic experiences each individual encounters.40 Experiences, as they
trigger genetic and then neurobiological responses, produce who we are, and they act to
bring about every one of our individual motivational sets: how we act in the many and
various situations we encounter.  Our unique motivational sets (or states) include (at least)
our “desires, evaluations, attitudes, projects, and so on:”41 what philosophers refer to as
“intentionality.”42 The question facing law is how this genetic and neurobiological data
effectuates a new normative view.
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III
In Greene and Cohen’s envisaging of neurobiology’s future, we will some day close the
gap completely between neuronal firing, the “tipping point moment,” and action.  When we
do, we will achieve a complete neurobiological explanation of the relationship between
material cause and observed effect.  At this point, they overstate the data in favor of hard
determinism.43 On their view, neuroscience,  as a factor in our social epistemology – those
“common sense” everyday thoughts we take as given, will push ever outward toward pure
mechanism or determinism.  Perhaps, but that conclusion simply is not clear, and in the
absence of clarity those of us who are as committed as they to a more compassionate model
of human behavior and punishment theory should not encourage it.  An alternative view,
which comports with neuroscience, confesses the limitations on our understanding of free
actions but suggests that some of us, by virtue of our own actual environments, may be freer
than others.  
What I develop next, however, is the case favoring their hard deterministic view,
beginning with the unique work of Benjamin Libet and those whose work seems to support
a hard deterministic explanation of human behavior.  I conclude that the data do not support
this view.  In the last section, I propose an alternative view that advances compassion in
punishment, and is consistent with what we know about evolutionary theory.
Libet’s work  provides support for a hard-determinist position, according to which all
of our behavior is neurobiologically determined; we have  no free will.  (Libet, ironically
perhaps, rejects this view, as I explain shortly.)  Greene and Cohen stake out a hard
determinist view.  Libet’s ingenious work divides heuristically into two parts.  The first
addresses the neurobiological composition of apparently freely-willed motor actions, the
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second puts a clock on our subjective perceptions of free will.  Both issues speak to staples
of our folk psychology and the legal culture we base thereon, where both free will and our
perceptions of free will are assumed to be consistent with Kantian compatibilist theory.
Although both assumptions need revision because our biology won’t permit certainty, the
data don’t yet permit the leap to hard determinism. 
A.  Freely willed actions.  
Our intuition tells us that voluntary actions follow a certain pattern and a necessary
timing sequence.  Our conventional folk psychology tells us that the progression from
preliminary cognition to voluntary action follows a minimally instrumental conception of
rationality:  (i) Desire + (ii) Belief 6 (iii) Action. In fact, our neurobiology is far more
attenuated.  It can be segmented into at least five conceptual steps (and doubtless more).
It runs as follows:  
(i)  Desire: From somewhere, a conscious intention arises, for example, a
desire to obtain food or money or good works; “I want X.” 
 
(ii)  Desirable passion (an occurrent psychological state):  We experience
some sort of favorable or pro-mental representation plus a corresponding
desirable or pro-preparatory state; together these states engage us in further
thoughts about what conduct we should engage in to reach the desired end. 
(From a pragmatic view, we distinguish between the desirable and the
desired.44) In technical terms, these patterns are culled from neuronal groups
mapped on our cortical laminae in memory/knowledge sites that ordinarily
produce a belief:  It begins with the thought, “I know how to get it.”  
(iii)  Belief centers activated (value centers triggered):  At some point we move
from desire to action, although how we do so – how we sustain a desired
action over time – is beyond current knowledge; hence it marks one of the
gaps in time/intentions that current neurobiology cannot answer.  Next an
internal mental event occurs (millions or billions of neurons firing) that
reflects our belief about how to obtain it; signals are sent to some part (or
parts) of our neurobiological anatomy, our hedonic centers, and then to the
periphery – our hands, our legs, our fingers, and so on). 
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(iv)  Belief engaged: The commands sent to our hedonic and motor (value)
centers, which are now fully involved. 
(v)  Act (and will):  The commands for movement are sent from our internal
images and plans and set our hands or legs or fingers in motion.45
 
From this complex sequence, the conventional wisdom finds a simple, practical syllogism
that explains “free will.”  From this naive perspective, free will is executed when the
conscious I decides it commences, and not before.  I am in control:  “I desire (or not) to reach
a goal,  I believe based on accessible knowledge, I act based on my choice.”46 No one doubts
that “we experience something like will.  The experience is not the question; the question is:
what does this experience entail?”47 There is also no doubt that even the five-part attenuated
scheme I’ve drafted has huge gaps in it.  Libet’s work tells us it doesn’t operate the way we
intuit it; it doesn’t tell us, however, how it does work.  
The questions raised are many and are particularly important for substantive criminal
law:  Who is the I whose agential capacities we suppose and celebrate?  And if he’s not
(always) the volitional I of our simple intuitions, what are we to make of this state of affairs?
Does one “choose” criminal activity and, if so, how did he get to the choice as a means of
satisfying a hedonic desire?  Why not honest conduct?  When is the will engaged?  And, most
importantly for now, what changes to our default expectations should we consider in light
of this new state of affairs?
Libet’s interest in consciousness and volition apparently began fortuitously as he
watched neurosurgeons operating on epilepsy patients nearly a half century ago.48
Conventional neurosurgical procedures often required surgical stimulation of areas of the
brain while the patients were awake and under local anaesthesia; this technique helped
surgeons figure out which areas of the brain were damaged and which were not.  Libet’s
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genius was at least in part in recognizing fairly quickly that these procedures presented an
opportunity to ask a fascinating question:  How much time transpires between the onset of
the cortical stimulation and our articulable conscious awareness of that stimulation?49 Libet
found that subjects reported awareness of a stimulus roughly ½ second after its onset.50 We
process the world.
His curiosity piqued, Libet asked a second question: Do the phenomena we perceive
as a “voluntary” begin with a conscious determination to act?  His interest was shared with
others.  By the mid-1960s, Libet was familiar with the work of two European neurologists
who had discovered that an electrical change in the scalp – a “readiness potential” or “RP”
– precedes the performance of “‘self-paced’ voluntary acts” by up to one full second.51 In a
series of observations and experiments that continue to this day, Libet and his research
group have tested this finding.  For example, they gave instructions to their subjects that
readers can follow and implement if they wish ( a process any reader of this manuscript can
fairly easily accomplish):
Hold out your arm in front of you.  Whenever you feel like it, of your own free
will, flex your wrist.  Repeat this . . . [40 times in his experimental regimen],
making sure you do it as consciously as you can.  You’ll probably experience
some kind of decision process, in which you hold back from doing anything
and then decide to act.52
In a word, Libet instructed his subjects to flex their wrists “freely and capriciously” whenever
they felt the urge.  Libet theorized that the brain began processes that we view as volitional
acts before the muscles actually moved.  He wanted to answer the following question:
“[W]hen does the conscious wish or intention (to perform the act) appear”?53 Recognizing
that, according to the conventional view of (our intuitions about) free will, consciousness of
an action should precede the command to the brain to perform an intended act, he
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understood that if the conscious will followed the onset of this electrical charge – the RP –
he would have to reevaluate his (and our) fundamental beliefs about free will.54
To test his hypothesis, Libet also asked subjects to report the time they first became
aware of the urge to act.  He used a “clock” whose dial was divided into 40 msec units.55
Libet found that for each group of subjects run through 40 trials, the onset of cerebral
activity preceded “voluntary” muscle movement by an average of 550 msec:  Conscious,
deliberate action began non-consciously.  Of equal importance, Libet’s team discovered that
their subjects first became aware of the wish to move their wrists about 350 msec later (that
is, about a second after the onset of cerebral activity), and 200 msec before actual muscle
movement began.  (These figures remained consistent, moreover, even when the subjects
reported some preplanning before the muscle movement.)  Correcting for timing biases, the
results indicated that the subjects’ brain processing, their RPs, began approximately 400
msec before the appearance of a conscious will to move, with an additional 150 msec
elapsing between subjective awareness and palpable muscle contraction.56 As Libet notes,
the actual pre-awareness processing probably begins earlier in an unknown area that
activates the supplementary motor area of the cerebral cortex.57 In other words, the
standard folk-psychological model, in which the mental processing of intention leads to and
must precede the action it purports to direct, appears wrong!  Volition begins, if it does not
end, in the non-conscious mind.  The figure below reveals the time line.
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Diagram of sequence of events, cerebral and subjective, that precede a fully self-initiated voluntary act.
Relative to 0 time, detected in the electromyogram (EMG) of the suddenly activated muscle, the readiness
potential (RP) (an indicator of related cerebral neuronal activities) begins first, at about 1050 ms. when some
preplanning is reported (RP I) or about 550 ms. with spontaneous acts lacking immediate pre-planning (RP
II).  Subjective awareness of the wish to move (W) appears at about 200 ms., some 350 ms. after onset of RP
II; however, W does appear well before the act (EMG).  Subjective timings reported for awareness of the
randomly delivered S (skin) stimulus average about -50 ms. relative to the actual delivery.58 
Note that there are three important time frames involved in this process:  (a) the time
between onset of RP II and  movement (0 sec), (b) the time between onset of RP II and
awareness of pending movement (W), and (c) the time between onset of awareness (W) and
movement (0).59 As the next section suggests, the subjective perception of awareness
implicates another way in which neurobiology shakes confidence in our trusted intuitions.
B.  Subjective perceptions –  Libet and his research team also pursued a second
project, closely related to the first:  namely, the temporal lag in the subjective perception of
the onset of discernible physical stimuli.60 Based on his early observations of epilepsy
surgery, Libet knew that it took roughly 500 milliseconds between the onset of direct cortical
stimulation and the individual’s actual awareness of the stimulation.  That is to say, patients
reported a peripheral body sensation, an “evoked response,” about ½ second after
stimulation had occurred.61 Libet’s work suggested, however, that we tend to experience the
onset of stimulation – say, touching a hot stove or stubbing your toe – well less than ½
second after its origin.
Self-initiated act: sequence
(pre-plans)         (no preplans)       (consc. wish)  
ø
EMG
      RP I              RP II  W           S ÷
* * * * *
________________________________________
   -1000                -500          -200            O msec 
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In contrast to the freely-willed movement condition, this research setting implicates
two timing issues: (a) the time lapse between onset of stimulus and movement, and (b) the
time lapse between stimulation and the subject’s reported awareness thereof.  Libet knew
from earlier research that it takes approximately 20 msec for a stimulus on an individual’s
periphery (a burn or pin prick or stub of a toe, for instance) to reach the cortex; but then it
takes the same 500 msec after processing the stimulus in the nervous system for the
sensation to travel back to the stimulated periphery as a burn to the hand.62 In fact, based
on work with patients suffering from dyskinesia, a complex of involuntary movements
related to Parkinson’s disease,63 Libet also found that we believe we are aware of the
stimulation before the ½ second transpires.  Libet’s experimental design to test his
hypothesis was elegantly simple.  First, he applied a stimulus directly to the cortex, knowing
that it took ½ second to generate an evoked response.  Four hundred milliseconds after the
onset of the cortical stimulus (one-tenth of a second before the subjects perceived the evoked
response), he applied a single impulse on the periphery, in this case the skin.  As he
predicted, all of the subjects experienced the second skin stimulus instead of the cortical
stimulus.  In fact, despite the neurochemical and electrical processes involved, the subjects
perceived no subjective delay between direct skin stimulation and response, despite
measurable delays that “should have” produced an evoked response from the cortical
stimulus.
What does this phantom reaction indicate?  When one adds these experimental data
to his work on freely willed movements, Libet’s research suggests that our brain is not only
at work before we’re aware of it, but it seems to trick us into perceiving conscious
participation in experiential processing only after the brain’s work is done.  What is clear is
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that our brain doesn’t “use the timing of its own firing to represent timing in the real
world.”64 The disconnect between the onset of action and our perception thereof is evident
and warranted.  Michael Gazzaniga elaborates and summarizes:
Major events associated with mental processing go on, measurably so, in our
brain before we are aware of them.  At the same time these done deals do not
leave us feeling we are only watching a movie of our life.  Because of temporal
referral mechanisms, we believe we are engaged in effecting these deals.65
Whether our belief in our own engagement is warranted is a distinct and, to date,
unanswered question; nonetheless, the phenomena Libet describes exist.  (It would also be
terribly distracting, as Gazzaniga notes, if we were required to participate consciously in all
of our cerebral processing.  And we don’t.)  And if we cannot determine how to interpret the
fact that consciousness begins in the non-conscious, and that we experience phantom
reactions to stimuli, then what?  What are our best practicable alternatives?
C.  What it means.  One can interpret Libet’s findings in several ways, but even those
who hope to reconcile the problematic nature of the timing of certain “volitional activities”
with the conventional account of free will acknowledge the integrity of Libet’s experimental
results.66 For example, the Brazillian neurologist Gilberto Gomes, a soft compatibilist,
acknowledges that conscious actions begin non-consciously, a conclusion he reaches for
three reasons.  First, he notes, the time gap between the beginning of RPII and the onset of
muscle contraction (approximately 500 msec) is well replicated.  Second, he cites the fact
that our conscious awareness of the act itself begins only after muscle contraction begins (or,
at the earliest, he believes, after the last motor command directing muscle contraction
occurs).  The act and our awareness of it, in Gomes’ reckoning, occur virtually (if not
actually) simultaneously.67 Third, he notes the fact that we lack awareness of the time gap
18
between the process that causes the act and the act itself, (or, with respect to “deliberated”
acts, between the intention to “act now” –  instantly – and the act.)68 Thus, he concludes,
“the onset of the RP cannot be the correlate of the conscious intention to act now . . . . [and]
the first part of the RP manifests neural processes that are not reflected in conscious
experience.”69 In other words, what we experience and describe as an intentional act begins
in non-conscious processes.
(i)  Dualism’s death . . . again – Although there is wide variation among dualist
ontologies, all share one basic doctrinal feature:  the belief that “the essential nature of
conscious intelligence resides in something nonphysical, in something forever beyond the
range of science like physics, neurophysiology, and computer science.”70 Conceived of as an
impenetrable subjective qualia (a descriptively irreducible qualitative state like color), the
argument for dualism is that our mind (our consciousness) subsists as a “separate,
mysterious kind of phenomenon, distinct from material or physical reality.”71 Why this
might be so rests on two erroneous folk psychological assumptions:  first, that consciousness
and subjectivity cannot be products of the body,72 and second, that if consciousness and
choice are embodied, our actions must be the product of causal determinism, and thus are
not our own.73 Libet’s research challenges these intuitions, which rebel against the notion
that our actions are determined exogenously.  “Reason and choice seem as different from
chance as from [external] causes.”74 Dualism provides one way out of this dilemma by
distinguishing between purely physical events and phenomenal events that connect with our
minds.  The dualist views the mind as independent of the body and thus capable of acting
outside the limitations of causal determinism, a conclusion that seems to follow in part from
the fact that we claim ownership only to that which we receive in our consciousness.  On this
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view, our thoughts seem to come from somewhere else.  But where is that somewhere else?75
That notion of “somewhere else” produces obvious problems.76 Libet’s research
establishes that even “voluntary” actions begin in measurable but non-conscious
neurobiological processes, perhaps in the fronto-basal ganglia.77 In fact, “[b]y the time we
think we know something – it is part of our consciousness – the brain has already done its
work.”78 That what we experience something as voluntariness that begins in the physical
brain should come as no surprise.  Where else could it come from?  Psychiatrists, for
example, have long known that schizophrenics report that actions to which they are subject
not only occur outside their control, but seem to be controlled by foreign actors.  Treated
with neuroleptic drugs that effect the brain, however, many regain their sense of control.79
We also know, of course, that the consumption of alcohol, the use of certain drugs, and the
occurrence of head trauma effect the brain – facts that unquestionably underscore the idea
that consciousness is associated with brain functions.80 The unmistakable inference is that
the brain controls voluntariness and not some mysterious unidentifiable outside force. 
This conclusion is fortified morphologically by the absence of any single locus within
the brain from which our intellectual functions emanate.  The reasoning process does not
occur in any single structure, what Daniel Dennett wryly dubbed the “Cartesian Theater,”
which projects a unified picture in our mind before we act.81 There is no single region in the
brain in which this occurs.82 Rather, to the extent that our mind appears to be a single
integrated entity – to the extent that it “binds”83 experience together – it apparently occurs
due to “the concerted action of large-scale systems by synchronizing sets of neural activity
in separate brain regions, in effect a trick of timing.”84 No lurking Homunculus thinking
about and organizing responses prior to their occurrence lurks inside or our brains, or
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outside for that matter.  What we have instead is a  “perpetually re-created neurobiological
state.”  We don’t even store whole pictures of events, etc. as memories; memory is itself
“selectional” in that it is “dynamically generated from the activity of certain selected . . .
circuits” and, accordingly, is “reconstructive.”85 Our brains, it turns out, are “a collection of
systems . . . each with different functions.”86 And each is affected by our unique
environments.
(ii)  Libet and volition – There are at least three approaches to Libet’s work, although
they are not cabined neatly.  One, an “illusionist’ view to which Greene and Cohen apparently
subscribe, finds within evolutionary theory a plausible (but normatively unacceptable and
unnecessary) explanation of the “illusion of the self” (where normativity clearly still has
ample room for various expressions.)  A second, an “evolutionary compatibilist” view,
subdivides into a variety of positions running from the traditionally rationalist (and
impressive) perspective of Gomes, to the even more traditional beliefs of Libet.   Rationality,
on these views, has adapted to its environment in rich fashion.  A third assessment, which
follows in the discussion of folk psychology, divides the issues, acknowledging that neither
broad view is unassailable.  It fully embraces the seriousness and difficulty of the questions
asked and the challenge of those that remain.  It asks a more pragmatic question instead:
Notwithstanding the existence of unanswered questions,87 what norms should we embrace
in light of what we do know about the answers to these questions?  The standards we adopt
for testing the existing norms follow from observations about how we treat nature’s least
fortunate among us, a process that provides some clues for a prescription that might permit
all of us to carry on with as much chance for selectional and cultural mastery as one might
reasonably hope for, all the premises considered.
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(A)  “The illusionist view” and the fictional nature of self – The most radical
interpretation of Libet’s work posits the absence of a genuine, controlling self.  The basic
argument is set out by Michael Gazzaniga.  Because awareness follows brain function, as
Libet has shown, Gazzaniga argues, that we create the illusion of control; that is to say, we
become aware of data after we have processed it and then adaptively trick ourselves into
believing that we exercise control.88 In this view, timing is everything.  Two British
neuroscientists, (mostly) consistently with Gazzaniga, recognize the adaptive usefulness of
feeling responsible for our actions.  They move beyond Libet’s research data (and anyone
else’s, for that matter) to the conclusion that “all the thoughts, ideas, feelings, attitudes and
beliefs traditionally considered to be the contents of consciousness are produced by
unconscious processes – just like actions and perceptions.”89 Consciousness, in this view,
“occurs too late to affect the outcome of mental processes that it is apparently linked to.”90
 We are, in effect, duped into believing that we exercise volitional control.
There is a substantial body of research that provides some support for concluding that
we lack a consciousness-non-consciousness bipolar switch that puts us into one condition
when we sleep and another when we wake.  In fact, the two states are remarkably
complicated.  For example, well rehearsed research on optical illusions implies that under
some circumstances, the non-conscious mind is not fooled under circumstances in which the
conscious mind is.91 Work with split brain patients, those who have suffered a rupture
between the left and right hemispheres of the brain such that they lose communication with
each other,92 indicates that some mental processing takes place of which we are unaware.93
Howard Shevrin, for example, has followed up Libet’s work by measuring perceptual
processing that occurs below the level of consciousness.94 In a typical experiment, the
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subjects are shown two visual stimuli for a period of time too brief to register in our
conscious awareness.  One picture has a meaningful content, such as a person holding a pen
in his hand resting on a knee, and the second, although similar, is considerably more
abstract.  Although the subjects are unable to identify either image on follow up tests, the
“meaningful” images produce far more brain wave activity than do the abstract images.
These results suggest that the more identifiable stimulus effects more attention and
mentation, even though the subjects are not consciously aware of any message.95 (It seems
that we learn even when the message is more contextual than advertent.96) To appreciate
the force of this research, take a minute – right now – and ask yourself about the next
thought in your mind or the next words that come out of your mouth or the next sentence
that emerges from the end of your finger tips and becomes visible on the computer screen
in front of you:  Where did they comes from?  How did that lost thought or word become an
immediate feature of your universe?  In truth, we don’t know!
A second, more far-reaching but normatively plausible illusionist interpretation of
Libet’s data (and others) comes from Professor Susan Blackmore.  Building on a suggestion
by Richard Dawkins in his book THE SELFISH GENE,97 Blackmore has postulated a more social
function for evolution, which rests on the idea of ubiquitous “memes.”98 Blackmore moves
from a position that seems at first more abstract than Gazzaniga’s.  On this view , the basic
idea of human evolution is replication: the human capacity for and proclivity to imitate our
environment as a means of transmitting not just biological data in the form of genes but
language and culture as well.  She suggests that the basic Darwinian idea of selection applies
to a “competition between memes [replicators, writ large] to get into human brains and be
passed on again.”99 Language in all its forms, including literature, music, religion, and so
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on, as well as behavior reflected in child rearing, sexual conduct and the like:  all begin in
large part as imitation.  Unlike our genetic progenitors, however, these ubiquitous memes
contain “instructions for carrying out human behavior, stored in brains (or other objects)
and passed on by imitation.”100 In an article in the NEW SCIENTIST, Blackmore explains:
Memes are the ideas, skills, habits, stories, songs or inventions that are passed
from person to person by imitation.  They have shaped our minds, leading to
the evolution of big brains and language because these serve to spread the
memes.  But the memes with the cleverest trick are those that persuade us that
our ‘selves’ really exist.101
Blackmore’s cites Libet’s work in support of her theory that “[t]here is no separate self
jumping into the synapses and starting things off.  My brain doesn’t need me.”102 
Such conclusions are radical, but they don’t undermine either the existence of
something like free will or the normative value of believing we exercise free will, even if, on
this understanding, the conscious I doesn’t do anything explicitly except tell me “what it is
like to be me now.”103 Consciousness and the experience of free will, Blackmore argues,
provide us with a belief in “self-ness.”  Blackmore surmises that “the illusion of continuity
and separateness” play valuable roles in our lives.104 This non-conscious processing “is
responsible for creating and maintaining . . . consistent self-representation.”  It provides a
picture of us and our world which is necessary for survival.  As she puts is, our mind
“enabl[es] us to feel the need to take responsibility by inventing plausible explanations based
on our biographical memory.”105 Although I am far less clear than she about self-control, I
agree that the self is an adaptive idea that permits us to occupy our own space within the
community, which helps in planning and strategizing, and is especially useful with respect
to our social interactions.  “The individual can form a model of what it is like to be another
person, . . . [which] can be used with great advantage to predict the desires and behaviors
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of others.”106 Consciousness provides purpose in the world, even though our thoughts and
feelings are (largely) orchestrated non-consciously.107
Although Greene and Cohen do not discuss or even cite Libet’s work, they
unabashedly subscribe to the illusionist view.  Discussing Daniel Wegner’s book, THE
ILLUSION OF CONSCIOUS WILL,108 they concur with Wegner’s view that “we feel as if we are
uncaused causers, and therefore granted a degree of independence from the deterministic
flow of the universe, because we are unaware of the deterministic processes that operate in
our own heads.”109 As the next section suggests, this conclusion is permissible but not
established.
(B) Evolutionary Compatibilists – Gilberto Gomes approaches the question of free
will from a neo-Kantian perspective, distinguishing between first person and third person
standpoints on free will.110 When an actor feels subjectively as if she determined her acts by
virtue of a conscious decision (where “conscious” describes an internal state according to
which we attend to a choice before making it), Gomes describes the experience from a first
person perspective.  Based on appearances, moreover, he affirms that we can judge the
actions of another as voluntary from a third person perspective; given the appropriate
evidence, we come to believe that the actor determined her own conscious decision.111 This
distinction is necessary for Gomes to address our perception that the voluntariness of our
own actions seems to conflict with causal determinism.  Choice, he acknowledges, implies
the ability to do otherwise.  We know, according to quantum theory, that the classical view
of physical theory is incorrect, at least at the quantum level.  Events at that level are
probabilistic and hence undetermined.  Moreover, at this level random events can serve as
causal initiators.  These observations, however, don’t implicate our first person view of the
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world.112 Dualism provides one way out of this dilemma by disjoining the mind from the
body, but Gomes rejects it for most of the reasons suggested earlier.113
 In contrast to the dualist resolution, the materialist monist or epiphenomenalist
argues that because our actions are causally determined by random probabilistic events, we
have no reason for concern.  They argue that consciousness, a product of brain mechanisms,
cannot for that very reason be the “cause” of anything else.114 If this is correct, Gomes
argues, issues of right and wrong are irrelevant because we cannot control anything and are,
therefore, responsible for nothing.  We should, according to Gomes’ description of the
epiphenomenalist injunction, just let things happen.  The representation of mind as
synonymous with brain states is based on a third person (theoretical) perspective; but,
according to Gomes, the epiphenomenalist conception of mind is internally inconsistent.
If there is no place for prescriptive analysis, saying that we “should” simply let things “be”
is incoherent; there is no “should” in a fully determined world.  On this view, the materialist
monist is hoisted on his own petard.115
Although his dismissal of epiphenomenalism is a bit facile (because his hypothesized
use of ‘should’ does not seem to reflect a prescription about individual responsibility but a
default conclusion respecting our tendency to worry – or not – about this problem), Gomes’
hopes to reconcile the traditional first person concept of voluntariness – I could have done
otherwise – with the third person perspective. What we need to “suppose,” he writes, is that
we humans possess
a decision system that can represent actions and action sequences before their
performance, that can select among them, and the output of which is not fully
determined by its input, but also by its internal state, by representations of
aims to be achieved, by internal criteria that affect its activity (moral and other
values), and also by a certain degree of randomness (which gives the arbitrary
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character that our choices often have).116
Note that whereas some philosophers analyze the question of what the phrase “free will”
means in the statement “I have free will,”117 Gomes asks what composes the “I” in the same
statement.  If we define I to include this partially non-conscious decision system – that is,
one in which consciousness is absent at the onset of the decision process – the actions that
follow are, in Gomes’ view, determined by ourselves:  “It is when we consider our self to be
pure spontaneity – a being that is not subject to causality – that we are in illusion.”118 In this
account, the choosing I includes those parts of the brain system that process information
before we are conscious of it, thus avoid the question of whether or not we possess conscious
control.  The crucial processing seems to reflect the appearance (at some point in time) of
internal representations guided in some way by internal criteria of which we are not initially
conscious. 
How, then, should we interpret Libet’s findings?  On Gomes’ view, we could consider
free will to include activity of the brain system, namely, structures that begin to fire just
prior to awareness.  This comports with the brain as part of a material system.119 After
parsing the word “intention,” and distinguishing among three different meanings – the
intention to act now, the intention to act sometime time in the future, and the irrevocable
decision to act now – he argues that “we should admit that every voluntary action is
preceded by an intention to act now, in the sense of a representation of the action that
precedes its performance.  But I argue that this intention does not always become conscious
as a separate event.”  Instead, he hypothesizes that often the conscious decision to act
voluntarily now might be “integrated into the experience of the movement itself.”120 In other
words, we act voluntarily, despite the non-conscious origins of those acts, because our
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awareness of the decision to move and the movement often occur simultaneously.  
The challenge with Gomes’ account, although it may be correct, is that it seems to ask
us to “suppose” the answer to the very question he poses:  What intentions precede
apparently freely willed actions? Not surprisingly, Libet disavows Gomes’ approach, that is,
one which embodies within the concept of “volition” a process over which we rather clearly
exercise no conscious control.121 Moving from a “common sense” definition of free will,
which may itself be problematic inasmuch as it incorporates in its definition the solution it
seeks to reach, he sought to assure endogenous decision-making by controlling for the
absence of external controls or cues “to affect the occurrence or emergence of the voluntary
act under study.”122 Libet attempted to create a testing climate in which the subjects would
perceive their movements as ones they wanted to execute on their own initiative and under
their own control.123 Libet thus rejects Gomes’ stance.  Following the traditional analytic
approach, he distinguishes between a non-conscious choice that becomes a conscious casual
event before the event occurs, and a choice of which we become conscious but over which
we have no conscious control.  Libet hopes thereby to makes sense of the 350 msec period
preceding awareness of anything. Libet’s understanding of free will requires some conscious
responsibility for an action before it occurs, and fully supports the law’s understanding of
intentional conduct:  
Intention = Desire + Belief Y Action 
“We do not hold people responsible for actions performed unconsciously, without the
possibility of conscious control.”124
Libet proposes, instead, that the time lapse after the onset of RPII – which precedes
awareness by approximately 350 msec – and the beginning of muscle movement
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(approximately !150 msec) is sufficient to permit the willing subject to veto the on-going
process that would, if left uninterrupted, produce deliberate activity.  “Processes associated
with individual responsibility and free will . . . operate not to initiate a voluntary act but to
select and control volitional outcomes.”125 
The most obvious objection to the veto is the question of why the veto itself doesn’t
begin 500 msec before the action; that is, why doesn’t the veto, like the action it prevents,
begin non-consciously?  If that is the case, the choice to prevent an action would also lie
outside conscious control and could not be a conscious causal event.  Libet struggles with
this objection, noting that the veto “may not require or be the direct result of preceding
unconscious processes.”126 Libet proposes, instead, a neurobiological distinction between
control and initiation functions, stating that there is “no logical imperative in any mind-
brain theory, even identity theory, that requires specific neural activity to precede and
determine the nature of a conscious control function.”127 
Libet acknowledges that the veto power requires conscious awareness of the event
about to begin; he suggests that we may need to redefine our understanding of “awareness,”
its relation to the content of awareness, and the neurobiological processes that generate
awareness and the contents of awareness.128 Note the distinction with Gomes’ explanation:
whereas Gomes attempts to redefine the first person I for purposes of determining free will,
Libet wants to redefine the concept of “awareness” along neurobiological lines.  Some earlier
research had suggested that awareness and the content of awareness involve different
timing sensations.129 “One need not think of awareness of an event as restricted to one
detailed item of content in the whole event.”130 Thus, an individual could be faced with a
whole mental representation within this 350-400 msec period and then decide what to do.
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As others have noted, free will, from Libet’s perspective, becomes free won’t.131
Libet’s most recent views raise almost as many questions as they hope to answer.
First, there is little evidence to support the veto and its ability to avoid non-conscious
preprocessing.  In fact, Libet had written earlier that nothing in his work intimated that the
conscious veto was not itself preceded by non-conscious cerebral processes.132 Of Libet’s
theory that the veto arises without prior initiation reflected in an RP, Gomes inquires:  “But
what about what we are conscious of as being a free decision that really initiates the
voluntary actions? . . . What about our feeling of being the true causes of our actions?”133
Libet’s explanation seems to deny the intuition that we really initiate, and don’t just manage,
our voluntary actions.  Our intuition seems to tell us not that we censor our voluntary
actions, but that we fully control them ex ante. Moreover, support for Libet’s interpretation
is, by his own admission, slight.  Libet writes only that “there is no experimental evidence
against” the veto and his explanation of it.134 Finally, Libet’s explanation drifts toward
dualism:  If voluntary activity begins in non-conscious processing, a view consistent with
causal determinism, there is no reason to suppose that the non-conscious processing that
precedes volition doesn’t precede it all the way down.  By hypothesizing the existence of a
fully conscious veto, Libet may either have stumbled into determinism or fallen prey to his
own compatibilist bias, which he achieves by separating the origins of volition from conduct
viewed as reflecting it.
IV.
Paƒe Greene and Cohen, the data do not permit a dispositive affirmation of radical
reductionism.  Libet’s data, which present  the strongest case, do not account for gaps in the
process from intentionality.  I want to suggest, however, that we do not need to answer these
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metaphysical questions to achieve the normative goals that Greene, Cohen and I, among
others, would like to achieve.135 The important normative questions rest on answers that are
incontrovertible.  My questioning begins by asking what we know about the distribution of
our genetic inheritance, and how should we use that knowledge to effect changes in our
norms.136 For one thing, we know that half of the chromosomes in your body and mine and
some six billion or so others come from our mothers and the other half from our fathers.
That’s a brute physical fact about human genetic variation that goes as far back as we can go
in history; that’s Darwin.  And, obviously, there’s a strong sense of genetic luck involved in
all this.  Just ask any parent who has raised 2 or more children and they’ll tell you:  “Yes,
they’re the same in some ways but they’re really, really different too.”  Similarly, the
environments in which each of us (often even siblings) is raised varies over a vast number
of variables and social scales – sometimes the scales are spaced on linear planes, sometimes
on curvilinear ones, and sometimes, I suspect, on both.  Those compounds of variation lead
to a conclusion that I find irresistible.  While determinism at some level may be inescapable,
it doesn’t operate uniformly:  Some people have better luck than others, including the moral
component of our neurobiological luck.137 If that’s right, then we are at least permitted to
infer that some people are far better equipped to deal with the settled and changing ethical
and criminal norms of our culture than are countless unlucky others.  
The implication of this point is that some of us are better adapted to the norms
required of civilized people than others, some of us, therefore, should know better, and some
of us, in consequence, more culpable conduct when we make poor decisions than others,
notwithstanding the necessary result that some, by virtue of their dangerousness, will
require incapacitation for some indefinite periods of time despite the lack of a moral
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capacity.  That conclusion, however, neither requires nor even permits us to treat them like
criminals.  I reach this conclusion because, contrary to the imaginative future produced by
Greene and Cohen, Libet’s work shows that there are temporal gaps between intention and
action.  Moreover, there are other gaps that we cannot fill, such as those that occur between
(a) the initial thought about possible future action and the decision to follow through with
it; (b) that decision point and the actual movement toward action; and (c ) the point of action
and, for example, pulling the trigger that kills an innocent victim.  At this point in time (at
least), we still have to intuit what fills these gaps and, more importantly, what may
transform the neuronal firings that produced the idea into the neuronal firings that
sustained the idea to the moment of action and, finally, into the neurons that took over as
our decision is verbalized and acted upon: “The salad, please.”  We need not take sides on
the data to conclude that some people seem to have some choice, at least some of the time.
The important point here is that the basics of neuroscience and genetics should effect
a more robust and compassionate model of human behavior for law, and the model need not
lead to a brand of radical reductionism posits the complete and always unencumbered
individual choice.  Reasonably imaginative and foreseeable neuroscientific data may put our
folk psychological intuitions about compatibilism on a collision course with our physicalist
intuitions about the nature of determinism, but whether it does so or not, we should move
us toward a critical mass that affects our moral and legal intuitions for the better.  
V.
There is an apparent retrospective magic about making good decisions when they’re
necessary, even when making tough decisions causes you to hold your breath and hope or
pray for a good outcome.  But, of course, that’s part of moral luck too.  The gift of good and
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reasoned decision-making is, like everything else in human behavior, a product of genes and
environment.  Some of us have been lucky, some not.  Those whose selectional opportunities
have been impoverished often should not be punished although they may need restraint;
those of use whose selectional opportunities have been rich should be held fully accountable.
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